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IMPLEMENTATION OF EU SANCTIONS AGAINST BELARUS

Abstract: *Sanctions are one of the most important approaches to resolving international conflicts, influencing regime change in a country and promoting democracy, peace and stability in the region. They are used as an alternative to the use of military force.*

The European Union, as one of the leading international organisations and actors in ensuring regional and international security, has been applying this practice for more than 70 years to overcome aggressive anti-lawful actions of countries that violate international law. This article focuses on the EU's sanctions policy against Belarus in 2004-2024.

The European Union's sanctions policy towards Belarus was implemented in two stages. At the first stage, the EU imposed sanctions on this country because of human rights violations, constant persecution of opposition members, and massive fraud during the presidential election, and the brutal suppression of peaceful protests. The second stage included EU sanctions against Belarus for its support and assistance to Russia in the war against Ukraine, especially in the issue of Russia's circumvention of European sanctions.

Between March 2022 and February 2024, a number of both personal and economic restrictive measures were introduced. Despite this, the EU's sanctions policy towards Belarus has not been very effective. In the case of Belarus, EU sanctions were more "like moral sermons, signals of moral superiority", which primarily affect the European Union itself financially. Therefore, in April 2024, the EU agreed to strengthen sanctions against Belarus.

Today, we can only hope that the strengthening of the EU's sanctions policy against Belarus will have a serious impact on both the economy and the overall development of the aggressor country, thereby forcing it to comply with international law.

Keywords: *sanctions, implementation of sanctions, European Union, Belarus*

Introduction. Despite the end of the Cold War and ideological confrontation in the world, tensions among international actors have not disappeared. On the contrary, with the beginning of the post-bipolar period, it has become even more intense, due to the growing number and frequency of international conflicts, confrontation of national interests of the leading actors in international relations, which together leads to the emergence of new and more dangerous challenges to international security. Among these destabilising challenges, the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, international terrorism, extremism, and

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uncontrolled local conflicts that could lead to the destruction of international stability are particularly acute.

To improve the principles and mechanisms for maintaining international order, representatives of the international community, including the European Union, have resorted to the use of sanctions, which are coercive measures imposed on states, organisations or individuals that threaten international peace and security, since the beginning of the post-bipolar period and to this day. Among them, it is worth highlighting Belarus, which today is an active ally of the Russian Federation in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The aim of the article is to highlight and analyse the implementation of the European Union's sanctions policy towards Belarus in 2004-2024.

Literature review. To date, we have a number of domestic and foreign scholarly works on the EU's sanctions policy towards the world's most notorious violators of international law in the 21st century: North Korea, Syria, Iran, Russia (O. Shnyrkov, A. Philipenko, R. Zablotska and et.al.¹, scientific works of M. Kapitonenko², Yu. Sedlyar³, L. Vovchuk⁴, A. Atamanenko, V. Piddubnyi⁵, O. Cheban and A. Kraskov⁶, O. Vaskiv⁷, K. Orynychuk⁸).

At the same time, insufficient attention has been paid to the implementation of the EU sanctions against Belarus, especially after 24 February 2022. Most of the available works are devoted to the analysis of the EU sanctions policy regarding Belarus' violation of democratic rights of the population from 2004 to 2016. Among them are the following works of F. Giumelli and P. Ivan⁹, B. Jarábik¹⁰.

As for the study of the EU's sanctions policy since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this issue is covered in the scientific article by V. Leukavets¹¹, who reveals

¹ Економічні санкції у сучасному світовому господарстві: монографія / О.І. Шнирков, А.С. Філіпенко, Р.О. Заблоцька та ін.; за ред. О.І. Шниркова. Київ: ВПЦ «Київський університет», 2019. 279 с.

² Капітоненко М. Антиросійські санкції: інструмент впливу чи демонстрація безсилля? // Міжнародний центр перспективних досліджень. 2018. URL: <https://bitly.ws/34A4M>

³ Седляр Ю. Міжнародні санкції у світовій політиці: теорія і практика. Монографія. Миколаїв: Вид-во ЧДУ ім. Петра Могили, 2013. 412 с.

⁴ Вовчук Л. Санкційна політика Європейського Союзу проти Ірану у XXI ст. // Acta de Historia & Politica: Saeculum XXI. 2023. № 5. С. 46-54; Vovchuk L. Strengthening of EU security policy in the conditions of excessive conflict situation in the region // Матеріали міжнародної очно-дистанційної науково-практичної конференції «Глобальні та регіональні виміри сучасної системи міжнародних відносин» (до 20-річчя кафедри міжнародних відносин та зовнішньої політики), (Миколаїв, 17 листопада 2023 р.). Миколаїв: ЧНУ ім. П. Могили, 2023. С. 5-6.

⁵ Атаманенко А., Піддубний В. Вплив російсько-української війни на енергетичну безпеку ЄС // Acta de Historia & Politica: Saeculum XXI. 2023. Special Issue. С. 35-47.

⁶ Чебан О., Краскова А. Труднощі взаємодії ЄС та КНР щодо вирішення іранської ядерної програми // Міжнародні та політичні дослідження. 2021. № 34. С. 151-166.

⁷ Васків О. ЄС посилив санкції щодо Ірану за підтримку Росії у війні проти України // Суспільне новини. 2023. 11 грудня. URL: <https://cutt.ly/HeoZp8EO>

⁸ Оринчук К. Після санкцій на імпорт титану Ірану має стати не вигідним постачання шахідів до РФ // Biznes Tsenzor. 2022. 23 листопада. URL: <https://biz.censor.net/m3381493>

⁹ Giumelli F., Ivan P. The effectiveness of EU sanctions – an analysis of Iran, Belarus, Syria and Myanmar (Burma). Brussels: European Policy Centre. 2013. № 76. URL: <https://cutt.ly/seoZasNw>

¹⁰ Jarábik B. Belarus. beyond sanctions. Madrid: FRIDE, 2011.

¹¹ Leukavets V. EU Sanctions Against Belarus in 2020-2022: Time for a Reappraisal // SCEEUS Report. 2022. № 7. URL: <https://sceeus.se/en/publications/eu-sanctions-against-belarus-in-2020-2022-time-for-a-reappraisal/>

the EU's sanctions policy towards this offending country in 2020-2022, focusing on the application of such sanctions as diplomatic, targeted or personal and economic sanctions. The author's list (5 items) of recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the EU's restrictive measures against Belarus is valuable. One of them is to strengthen the coordination of the EU's sanctions with the United States and other influential Western countries (the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland).

The results and discussions. Restrictive measures against Belarus were first imposed in 2004 in response to the non-recognition of the results of the elections and referendum in the country held in October of that year, as well as the unsolved disappearances of two opposition politicians, a businessman and a journalist in 1999-2000 who 'opposed the Lukashenko regime'¹².

In 2006, for these violations and the suppression of opposition rallies, the EU extended sanctions against Belarus in two stages. Since March 2006, the European Union has banned 30 Belarusian officials, including President Lukashenka, from entering its territory. In 2007, the United States and Canada joined the EU sanctions and imposed trade sanctions against the offending country. In addition, Washington and Brussels froze the assets of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka, the heads of the special services, the Prosecutor General and the Speaker of the lower house of the National Assembly¹³.

In 2011, the EU Council adopted additional restrictive measures against those Belarusian representatives involved in violations of international electoral standards, international human rights law, and the suppression of civil society and democratic opposition. These measures included an arms embargo, a ban on the export of goods for internal repression, an asset freeze and a ban on entry to EU countries.

However, the EU was ready to reconsider and somewhat reduce the 'restrictive measures' against Belarus on the condition that all Belarusian political prisoners without exception were released and that the upcoming parliamentary elections in the country were held in accordance with international requirements. Only 4 years later, Belarus decided to make these concessions, thus contributing to the warming of relations with the EU. On 22 August 2015, all Belarusian political prisoners were released, and on 11 October 2015, violence-free presidential elections were held. Therefore, on 15 February 2016, the EU Council decided to lift sanctions restrictions on 170 individuals and three Belarusian companies, while maintaining an arms embargo and sanctions against four individuals¹⁴. In 2017, these sanctions were extended until 28 February 2018¹⁵.

On 9 August 2020, the Republic of Belarus held presidential elections, which, according to reports of national observers, did not meet international standards. Falsified election results (Alexander Lukashenko received 80.23% of the vote, Sviatlana Tikhonovskaya - 9.9%¹⁶)

¹² Економічні санкції у сучасному світовому господарстві... С. 195.

¹³ EU restrictive measures against Belarus // European Council. URL: <https://cutt.ly/GeoZaEwY>

¹⁴ ЄС продовжив санкції проти Білорусі ще на рік // РБК-Україна. 2008. 8 квітня. URL: https://daily.rbc.ua/ukr/show/es_prodlil_sanktsii_protiv_belorussii_eshche_na_god080420081

¹⁵ Belarus sanctions: EU delists 170 people, 3 companies; prolongs arms embargo // Council of the EU. 2016. 25 February. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/25/belarus-sanctions/>

¹⁶ ЄС на рік продовжив санкції проти Білорусі // ЛБ.ua. 2017. 28 лютого. URL: https://lb.ua/world/2017/02/27/359862_es_god_prodlil_sanktsii_protiv.html

caused a number of protests by the Belarusian population, which voted for Tikhanovskaya at polling stations (in some areas, she received 70-80% of the vote). Following the protests, the state authorities used disproportionate violence, resulting in at least two deaths and many injuries. In response to the unacceptable violence of the Belarusian authorities against peaceful protesters, intimidation, arbitrary arrests and detentions, the EU and its member states demonstrated their unwavering support for the Belarusian people by adopting a series of restrictive measures against Belarus on 3 October 2020¹⁷.

The EU sanctions imposed on Belarus resulted in the EU's closure to the country, especially with regard to foreign trade operations. As a result, the Belarusian economy was negatively affected. In order to 'get even' with the EU, in June 2021, the country began to provide flights and domestic travel for migrants from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria (fleeing the terrible conditions in their own countries) to the EU: Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. For example, illegal arrivals to Lithuania in 2021 were more than 50 times higher than in 2020. Poland also saw a significant increase in illegal border crossings from Belarus, while in Latvia, the figures were much lower. Thanks to concerted EU efforts, the number of daily illegal arrivals has fallen sharply. However, migration pressure at the border remained high¹⁸.

As a result, on 21 June 2021, the EU adopted the 4th package of sanctions against Belarus, which imposed restrictive measures against 78 Belarusian individuals and 8 legal entities. In addition, seven individuals and one organisation were subject to these sanctions due to the forced and illegal landing of a Ryanair flight carrying migrants in Minsk on 23 May of the same year¹⁹. On 25 June 2021, EU leaders condemned all attempts by third countries to use migrants for political purposes²⁰.

In view of the migration pressure along the EU's external borders, the EU has strongly condemned the Lukashenka regime for deliberately endangering migrants' lives and fuelling the border crisis in an attempt to divert attention from the situation in Belarus. On 18 August 2021, a videoconference of interior ministers was organised under the Council's Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM), where the representatives present strongly condemned Belarus' use of migration pressure, its contribution to the organisation of illegal border crossings with the EU, and its attempts to instrumentalise people for its own political purposes.

The Ministers expressed their solidarity with the affected Member States and supported the provision of additional assistance to this section of the EU's external border. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and Europol have deployed a large number of officers and experts, as well as provided technical equipment. In addition, the Union's Civil Protection Mechanism was activated, mobilising significant support from Member States and other member states²¹.

On 21-22 October 2021, at the European Council, EU leaders stated that the

¹⁷ Вибори президента Білорусі: оголошені попередні результати // BBC News Україна. 2020. 10 серпня. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-53719392>

¹⁸ Restrictive measures following the 2020 Belarus presidential elections // Council of the EU. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/belarus/#borders>

¹⁹ European Council conclusions, 24-25 June 2021 // Council of the EU. 2021. URL: <https://cutt.ly/beoZpSRI>

²⁰ Belarus: fourth package of EU sanctions over enduring repression and the forced landing of a Ryanair flight // Council of the EU. 2021. 21 June. URL: <https://cutt.ly/beoZi2u7>

²¹ European Council conclusions, 24-25 June 2021 // Council of the EU. 2021. URL: <https://cutt.ly/TeoZiKGv>

organisation would continue to counter the ongoing hybrid attack launched by the Belarusian regime, including by adopting further restrictive measures against individuals and entities. Therefore, already in November 2021, the Council approved the partial suspension of the EU-Belarus Visa Facilitation Agreement for officials associated with the Belarusian regime²² and amended its sanctions regime by expanding the criteria for designation²³.

Recognising the dire situation faced by third-country refugees, on 17 November 2021, the EU allocated €700,000 in humanitarian aid to support vulnerable people stranded at the border with Belarus²⁴. On 23 November 2021, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy proposed new measures to prevent and restrict the activities of transport operators involved in or facilitating smuggling and trafficking in human beings in the EU²⁵. On 1 December 2021, the Commission proposed a series of measures to provide temporary asylum and assistance to Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in dealing with the emergency situation on the border with Belarus. These measures have enabled these Member States to put in place swift and orderly procedures to deal with the situation, fully respecting fundamental rights and international obligations²⁶.

On 2 December 2021, the EU adopted the 5th package of sanctions against Belarus, which targeted 17 individuals and 11 legal entities representing the judiciary, propaganda media that contributed to the continued repression of civil society, the democratically-minded opposition, independent media and journalists, as well as high-ranking political officials of the Lukashenko regime and companies (such as Belavia), tour operators, hotels, which helped to incite and organise illegal crossings of the border between Belarus and the EU, and thus participated in the instrumentalisation of migration for political purposes²⁷.

On 24 February 2022, the EU Council decided to extend restrictive measures against Belarus for another year, until 28 February 2023, given the deteriorating situation in the country²⁸.

A new challenge for the EU was Belarus's participation in Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022. The EU condemned in the strongest terms Belarus's involvement in Russia's unprovoked and unjustified military invasion of Ukraine. And in response, on 2 March 2022, the EU introduced a package of individual and economic sanctions against 22 high-ranking Belarusian military officials involved in decision-making

²² Home affairs ministers express solidarity with the EU member states at the border with Belarus (Slovenian presidency's press release, 18 August 2021) // Council of the EU. 2021. URL: <https://cutt.ly/reoZpuij>

²³ Belarus: Council suspends visa facilitation provisions for officials of the Belarus regime // Council of the EU. 2021. 9 November. URL: <https://cutt.ly/2eoZpmbX>

²⁴ Belarus: EU broadens scope for sanctions to tackle hybrid attacks and instrumentalisation of migrants // Council of the EU. 2021. 15 November. URL: <https://cutt.ly/ieoZuZjk>

²⁵ Belarus: EU allocates €700,000 in humanitarian assistance for vulnerable people stranded at the border // Council of the EU. 2021. 17 November. URL: <https://cutt.ly/ZeoZiIuI>

²⁶ EU restrictive measures in view of the situation in Eastern Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea // Council of the European Union. 2014. 29 July. URL: <https://cutt.ly/ueoZa4j8>

²⁷ Asylum and return: Commission proposes temporary legal and practical measures to address the emergency situation at the EU's external border with Belarus // European Commission. 2021. 1 December. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6447

²⁸ Belarus: EU adopts 5th package of sanctions over continued human rights abuses and the instrumentalisation of migrants // Council of the EU. 2021. 2 December. URL: <https://cutt.ly/seoZuxpG>

and strategic planning for Russia's aggression against Ukraine. This included an asset freeze, a ban on providing funds to individuals and entities on the list, and a travel ban to EU countries.

The Council of the EU also imposed additional restrictions on trade in goods used for the production or manufacture of tobacco products, mineral fuels, bitumen, gaseous hydrocarbon products, potassium chloride products (potash), wood products, cement, iron, steel and rubber. Further restrictions were also imposed on the export of dual-use goods and technologies, as well as on certain advanced goods and technologies that could contribute to the military, technological, defence and security development of Belarus, as well as restrictions on the provision of related services.

This package also included providing the Ukrainian Armed Forces with equipment and supplies through the European Peacekeeping Fund, a ban on flights over EU airspace and access to EU airports for Russian carriers of all kinds, a ban on transactions with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, a SWIFT ban for some Russian banks, and a ban on state media outlets Russia Today and Sputnik from broadcasting in the EU²⁹.

On 9 March 2022, the EU Council adopted new sanctions against Belarus, which included restrictions on the provision of specialised financial messaging services (SWIFT) to three Belarusian banks; a ban on transactions with the Central Bank of Belarus; a ban on listing and providing services in respect of shares of Belarusian state-owned companies on EU trading platforms; a significant restriction on financial flows from Belarus to the EU; and a ban on the provision of euro-denominated banknotes to Belarus³⁰.

Considering the internal repression of those dissatisfied with Lukashenko's authoritarian regime and those unwilling to fight with Ukraine, the EU imposed new sanctions on 3 June 2022 against 12 individuals and 8 legal entities directly involved in and benefiting from these repressions. The new list includes high-ranking government officials, businessmen and their families, members of the judiciary, and prominent propagandists³¹.

However, the restrictive measures imposed against Belarus did not help it to abandon the ongoing human rights violations in the country and to help Russia continue its military aggression against Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. Therefore, on 3 August 2023, the EU Council imposed sanctions on 38 more individuals and 3 organisations, extending the ban to include exports of firearms, aerospace and aerospace products³². On 22 August, Ukraine, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway also joined the EU sanctions³³. The restrictive measures were intended to ensure closer alignment of EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus and to help ensure that Russian sanctions could not be circumvented by Minsk.

²⁹ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/307 of 24 February 2022 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus // EUR-Lex. 2022. URL: <https://cutt.ly/leoZuibO>

³⁰ Belarus' role in the Russian military aggression of Ukraine: Council imposes sanctions on additional 22 individuals and further restrictions on trade // Council of the EU. 2022. 2 March. URL: <https://cutt.ly/2eoZufOn>

³¹ Russia's military aggression against Ukraine: EU imposes sanctions against President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov and adopts wide ranging individual and economic sanctions // Council of the EU. 2022. 25 February. URL: <https://cutt.ly/feoZyftpt>

³² Belarus: EU adopts new round of restrictive measures over internal repression // Council of the EU. 2022. 3 June. URL: <https://cutt.ly/seoZyTkR>

³³ Україна та ще сім країн приєдналися до санкцій ЄС проти Білорусі // Слово і Діло: аналітичний портал. 2023. 22 серпня. URL: <https://cutt.ly/zeoZyXnU>

Notably, the new EU sanctions against Belarus in August were much milder than the sanctions imposed against Russia. According to the analytical portal 'Slovo i Dilo', one of the reasons for the EU's decision was a request from Ukraine itself³⁴. However, as early as 14 October 2022, representatives of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Ireland stressed that sanctions against Belarus should be synchronised with the sanctions imposed against Russia³⁵. In that case, these sanctions would have been more effective than they turned out to be.

In the opinion of the authors, this position of the Ukrainian authorities is explained by the hope of reducing Belarusian support for Russia in the Russian-Ukrainian war. As far as is known, before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belarus acted as a mediator in resolving the small Russian-Ukrainian war. However, these hopes proved to be in vain, as the Lukashenka regime continues to pursue internal repression in the country and support Russia against Ukraine. Given this fact, on 26 February 2024, the EU decided to extend restrictive measures against Belarus for another 1 year - until 28 February 2025³⁶.

On 17 April 2024, EU leaders will meet to discuss the preparation of new sanctions against the country. Latvian Prime Minister Evika Silina stressed that the proceeds from frozen assets should be used for the benefit of Ukraine³⁷. On 23 May of the same year, it became known that the EU was implementing tougher sanctions against Belarus by restricting imports of luxury cars to this country, which it then exports to Russia.

The monthly flow of vehicles and spare parts to Belarus from the EU increased from \$50 million in January 2022 to \$268 million in January 2024. The largest increase in exports was recorded in the most expensive categories of cars, i.e. those that were subject to EU sanctions against Russia. EU customs officials believe that Belarusian companies have become a key component of Russian smuggling networks. According to the Financial Times, despite the sanctions, luxury cars such as Rolls-Royce and Maybach are still being imported into Russia. At the same time, they get to Russia within a few months after leaving the factory³⁸.

As early as 2021, the leader of the Belarusian opposition in exile, Sviatlana Tikhanovskaya, said in the European Parliament that Belarus was becoming the 'North Korea of Europe'. The EU's sanctions against this country are not effective enough. In the case of Belarus, "the sanctions are more like moral sermons, signals of moral superiority" which primarily affect the European Union itself financially. For example, according to some estimates, anti-Russian sanctions after the invasion of Crimea cost Europe one hundred billion Euros³⁹.

³⁴ Belarus: EU adopts new round of individual sanctions over continued human rights abuses and imposes further targeted measures in response to involvement in Russia's military aggression against Ukraine // Council of the EU. 2023. 3 August. URL: <https://cutt.ly/5eoZy0OW>

³⁵ *Боженко А.* П'ять країн ЄС хочуть синхронізувати санкції проти Білорусі та Росії, – ЗМІ // Главком. 2022. 14 жовтня. URL: <https://cutt.ly/LeoZoXMF>

³⁶ ЄС не ввів санкції проти Білорусі нарівні з РФ через прохання України – журналіст // Слово і діло: аналітичний портал. 2023. 12 січня. URL: <https://cutt.ly/4eoZo01e>

³⁷ *Лисогор І.* У ЄС готують нові санкції проти Білорусі та Ірану: за їхню допомогу Росії // LB.ua. 2024. 18 квітня. URL: https://lb.ua/world/2024/04/18/609048_ies_gotuyut_novi_sanktsii_protii.html

³⁸ ЄС посилить санкції проти Білорусі, щоб обмежити імпорт до РФ елітних авто, – FT // РБК-Україна. 2024. 23 травня. URL: <https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/es-posilit-sanktsiyi-proti-bilorusi-shchob-1716443585.html>

³⁹ Belarus: EU prolongs restrictive measures for another year // Council of the EU. 2024. 26 February. URL: <https://cutt.ly/BeoZoWxB>

Conclusions. Thus, if we analyse the EU's sanctions policy towards Belarus, we can distinguish two stages. At the first stage, the EU imposed sanctions against the country in connection with repressions against the opposition, human rights violations, and massive fraud during the presidential election, and the brutal suppression of peaceful protests. In total, from 2004 to 2022, 6 packages of sanctions were introduced against 195 individuals and 35 legal entities, which include freezing their assets and prohibiting EU citizens and companies from providing funds to sanctioned persons, banning entry to the EU for persons on the sanctions list, etc. However, it is worth noting that the EU's sanctions policy was quite flexible.

The second stage is the EU's sanctions against Belarus for its support and assistance to Russia in the war against Ukraine. Between March 2022 and February 2024, a series of both personal and economic restrictive measures were introduced. And in April-May 2024, EU representatives decided to impose more stringent sanctions on Belarus. Despite this, the EU's sanctions policy towards Belarus has not been very effective. It is clear that sanctions against Belarus have had some impact on its economy, forcing the country to seek economic rescue from Russia. Therefore, the EU's sanctions policy should be tougher on Russia itself, which, if weakened, will not be able to help overcome the economic crisis in Belarus and thus give it the 'fuel' to continue fighting on Russia's side.

Людмила Вовчук, Андрій Волківський

Імплементація санкцій ЄС проти Білорусії

Анотація: Одним із важливих підходів до врегулювання міжнародних конфліктів, впливу на зміну поведінки режиму в країні та сприяння демократії, миру та стабільності у регіоні є санкції. Вони використовуються як альтернатива застосуванню військової сили.

Європейський Союз, як одна із провідних міжнародних організацій та акторів у забезпеченні регіональної та міжнародної безпеки, більше, ніж 70 років застосовує саме таку практику подолання агресивних антиправих дій країн-порушниць міжнародного права. Пропонована стаття присвячена висвітленню санкційної політики Європейського Союзу проти Білорусії упродовж 2004–2024 рр.

Санкційна політика Європейського Союзу щодо Білорусії здійснювалася у два етапи. На першому етапі ЄС ввів санкції проти цієї країни через порушення прав людини, постійні переслідування членів опозиції, масові фальсифікації під час президентських виборів та жорстке придушення акцій мирних протестів. Другий етап – санкції ЄС проти Білорусії через її підтримку і допомогу Росії у війні проти України, особливо у питанні обходження Росією європейських санкцій.

Упродовж з березня 2022 по лютий 2024 рр. було введено низку як особистих, так і економічних обмежувальних заходів. Але не дивлячись на це, санкційна політика ЄС щодо Білорусії виявилася не надто ефективною. У випадку з Білорусією санкції ЄС були більше «схожі на моральні проповіді, сигнали моральної переваги», від застосування яких у першу чергу фінансово страждає сам Європейський Союз. Тому, у квітні 2024 р. ЄС погодив питання посилити санкції проти Білорусії.

Сьогодні лише залишається сподіватися, що посилення санаційної політики ЄС проти Білорусії серйозно вплине як на економіку, так і загальний розвиток країни-агресорки, що тим самим змусить її дотримуватися норм міжнародного права.

Ключові слова: санкції, імплементація санкцій, Європейський Союз, Білорусія